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COMMENTS
Constitutional Law: Segregation in the Schools-Statute Enabl-
ing Governor of Arkansas to Close Integrated Schools-Act 4 of
the Second Extraordinary Session of the 1958 General Assembly
empowered the Governor of Arkansas to close any school whenever he
felt (1) there was actual or impending domestic violence, (2) Federal
troops were stationed in the public school area, or (3) an efficient edu-
cational system could not be maintained because of integration of the
races in the schools. Acting pursuant to this law, Governor Faubus
closed the Little Rick School District on Sept. 15, 1958. Petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of Act 4 under both the state and Fed-
eral Constitutions. Held, Act 4 violated neither the state nor the Fed-
eral Constitution. Garrett v. Faubus-Ark.-, 323 S.W. 2d 877
(1959). The court declared the Act was valid under the state con-
stitution since it was not unconstitutional on its face, and the court did
not feel bound to "speculate on facts that might tend to invalidate this
Act."1 Similarly there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution since the state merely exercised its
police powers "to guide the course of segregation so as to protect the
public welfare. ' 2
The position which the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken seems
irreconcilable with four recent federal court decisions.
Acting on his own initiative in 1957, Governor Faubus ordered the
State National Guard to close the schools of the Little Rock School
District. The local school board applied for permission to suspend a
judicially-approved school integration plan in the light of great domestic
violence surrounding the school area. The Supreme Court of the United
States denied permission in Cooper v. Aaron, stating: "law and order
are not to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their con-
stitutional rights."3 The court pointed out that these rights were
secured by the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the now famous case of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka4 which declared that a dual system of education was inherently
unequal. Therefore, it can be seen that any law such as Act 4 runs
contra to the ruling of Cooper v. Aaron5 for it, in effect, gives a state,
acting through one of its agencies, the power to frustrate a legitimate
desegregation plan proposed by a school board. In Garrett v. Faubus,6
the Governor, in closing the schools of Little Rock, actually suspended
the approved integration plan which had been reinstated after the
decision in the Cooper7 case.
1 -Ark.- , 323 S.W. 2d 877 at 878 (1959).
2 Id. at 882.
3358 U.S. 1 at 16 (1958).
4347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Supra note 3.
6 Supra note 1.
7 Supra note 3.
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However, a state can exercise flexibility in planning for integration.
The Supreme Court in the time-table Brown8 case recognized that the
transition from segregation to integration would be strewn with diffi-
culties such as available room, teaching capacity, transportation, and
adequacy of the pupil's academic preparation, and the court allowed
time for their solution. But that flexibility does not include the power
to close schools such as is authorized by Act 4. The Supreme Court in
the Brown9 case made it very clear that a prudent start toward integra-
tion could be found in token enrollment of Negro children when it said:
*. . that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once
such a start has been made, the courts may find additional time
is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner.
(Emphasis added) 10
It would seem to be a fair implication from this statement that a state
is not complying with the Brown." ruling until it has opened all its
schools with the potentiality for integration in each school. To do less
would be to deny the equal protection of the laws to those students who
had attended schools now closed.
A prime example of flexibility within a state to plan for integration
is found in the case of Evans v. Buchanan12 where petitioners brought
a class action to compel the State School Board to admit them to a pub-
lic school on a racially non-discriminatory basis. The Court denied
Negro petitioners their request because their admission did not con-
form to the School Board's plan for desegregation. Noting the case of
Cooper v. Aaron," the Court said:
Here, however, we are faced, not with the question of
whether there shall be integration at all, but with deciding the
most sensible way of carrying out what is already an accom-
plished fact."4
Because wholesale violence threatened the atmosphere, the Court felt
it would be more beneficial to the students themselves were integration
allowed to proceed at the pre-ordained pace. The Garrett"5 case is
very different, of course, because there the state court sanctioned a
law to close schools which seems to overstep the boundaries of flexi-
bility by abrogating any plan for integration.
Had the Governor closed all the schools of Arkansas his position
would have been substantially stronger. There appears to be no ques-
tion that a state may completely abolish its school system. Such was
s Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
0 Ibid.
10 Id. at 300.
11 Ibid.
12 172 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del. 1959).
13Supra note 3.
14 Supra note 12 at 514.
15Supra note 1.
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the holding in James v. Almond.16 There, Virginia's massive resistance
laws,17 which authorized the Governor to close any integrated school,
were tested and declared unconstitutional. The Governor had closed
six secondary schools in the city of Norfolk, displacing 9,900 white and
17 colored children, merely because the schools had been integrated.
The court said that this was a denial of the "equal protection" of the
laws because the remaining schools in the city and throughout the state
were allowed to remain open. Similarly in the Garrett case, only the
schools of the Little Rock district were closed, and yet the Arkansas
Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion as to the constitution-
ality of a law very similar in substance to the Virginia laws. In order
to escape the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment the legislative
enactment must authorize the closing of all schools simultaneously,
thereby depriving both colored and white children the right to educa-
tion.
It might be argued that Act 4 does in fact give the Governor the
power to close all the schools of the state. However, this does not seem
to be a valid argument, for Act 4 is admittedly an emergency measure
to protect the efficiency of the school system, and by the terms of the
Act the Governor can only close those schools surrounded by troops or
threatened with violence and inefficiency in maintenance of the school
system because of integration of the races. These are the only standards
to guide the Governor's actions. In closing all the schools, there could
be no authority gleaned from the Act that would sustain the closing of
an all-white school not threatened by violence and integration.
A very recent federal district court decision lends further credence
to the view that Act 4 is unconstitutional on its face. While petitioner
Garrett was raising the issue of constitutionality, in the state court of
Arkansas, petitioner Aaron proceeded directly to the District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas to test the constitutionality of Act 4.
In Aaron v. McKinley"" the court ruled that Act 4 was unconstitutional
on its face, citing Cooper v. Aaron. The district court there, finding
little need to support its position with extensive authority, permanently
enjoined the state:
: * . from engaging in any acts which will directly or indirectly
impede, thwart, delay or frustrate the execution of the approved
plan for gradual integration of the schools of Little Rock. . .. 19
While the district court's position is not conclusive, there can be
little doubt that the United States Supreme Court would overrule
Garrett v. Faubus.20  WILLIAm FITZEUGH Fox
16 170 F. Supp. 331 (D. Va. 1959).
17 Acts 1959, Ex. Sess. ch. 77.18 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
19 Id. at 952.
2o Supra note 1.
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